American “War On Drugs” in Colombia - Part TWO

Continuing my previous article, now I am going to discuss the ineffective results of the America's policy toward Colombia during the last decades.

Regarding the “War on Drugs”, the latest US Department of State's International Narcotics Control Strategy Report states that in 2008 the joint-efforts between US and Colombia managed to destroy more than 220,000 hectares of coca. They also seized 223 metric tons of cocaine in 2008, an all-time record, destroyed 3,500 cocaine labs and extradited 208 suspects.

On the other hand, figures pointed that coca leaf and cocaine production in the Andean region appear to have set new records in 2007. If the objective was to slash by 50% the production of cocaine, as established by the Plan Colombia in 2000, the American policy is far from succeeding.

Furthermore, the price of cocaine has been decreasing, despite the enormous amounts of money invested in its combat. In 1990, the cocaine retail price in the US was 284 dollars per gram. In 2007, its price was estimated in 119 dollars.

In some aspects, one might defend that for the Colombian state and society the US-Colombian policies have developed, to some extent, satisfactory results, such as:

> By 2004, the paramilitary and guerilla groups had lost most of their popular support—AUC had 10% of approval, the FARC had 3% and the ELN only 2. On the other hand, the President and the Armed Forces had more than 70% of support;
> During the current administration of the President Alvaro Uribe (picture), the homicide rate was reduced by 19%, the kidnappings by 39%, terror attacks by 42% and new internal displacements by 46%;
> Lately, the Colombian state has sought to regain control of the country by increasing the numbers and capacity of troops and police units and by deploying them across the country to challenge the guerrillas.

However, there are also some negative aspects to be considered, including:

> Due to the efforts to eradicate the drug issue, there has been a severe deterioration in the dimensions related to effective protection of civil liberties and subordination of the military in Colombia;
> Despite all the efforts so far, Colombia remains the world's major cocaine producing country;
> After the dismissal of the Medellín and the Cali drug cartels in the 1990s, it is estimated that some 140 much smaller groups appeared, and some of them moved to Mexico and Haiti;
> Finally, it is inevitable to say that the FARC and the ELN are still active in Colombia. Even if their power are not as dangerous as 10 or 15 years ago, they are still there.

If we take both the American and the Colombian societies's perspectives to evaluate this "War on Drugs", it seems fair to argue that those partial results are certainly below the acceptable, especially if we consider the social, political and financial costs of this war so far. A change in this policy must come. But the recommendations for the future will be discussed only on my final article about this issue.

American “War On Drugs” in Colombia - Part ONE

Introduction

Illegal drug use kills nearly 50,000 persons annually in the United States and the costs related to drugs, including health care, accidents, policing, and lost productivity, reached 160 billion dollars in 2000. Because of that, during past years, almost 50% of US foreign assistance has gone to fighting this war.

For the same reason, as well as because Colombia provides 90% of the cocaine entering the US, this South American country received for the last three years 1 billion dollars from the White House. So, if the United States has been engaged for four decades in its “War on Drugs”, Colombia has certainly been its battlefield since the 1980s.

As a major issue in this “War on Drugs”, there is the internal political—and armed—struggle in Colombia. There, three groups have been competing for the political authority and for the monopoly of force—the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC), the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN), and, more recently, the Colombian Self Defense Forces (Fuerzas de Autodefensa de Colombia, AUC)—, as well as hundreds of international drug cartels.

The FARC and the ELN appeared in the 1960s based on Marxist’s teachings and revolutionaries ideals. They resorted to kidnapping, extortion and “revolutionary taxes” to fund its insurgents. To challenge them, supported sometimes by the state, or by farmers or even by drug cartels, the paramilitary groups were created. The most important is the AUC, established in the 1980s.

In recent years, the reality is that those groups became deeply involved with trafficking of drugs, which makes really hard to distinguish any revolutionary ideal or self-defence effort from the cocaine business.

Due to those groups, in the early 2000s, the Colombian state did not exercise control over an estimated 40% of the national territory and the violence rates in Colombia were between the highest in the whole world.

On my next text, I will explain the US Foreign Policy toward Colombia and its ineffective results so far.

American approach to security

"Tell me where you put your money, and I'll tell you what your foreign policy is. If you put over 90 cents of your foreign policy dollar into the Pentagon and the CIA, then your policy is going to emphasize a military approach, a secretive, under the [table] approach, to the problems. For example, the budget for the White House Drug Office, this office of Narcotics Control, is greater than the State Department and the Commerce Department put together”. 98 [quoting Ambassador Robert White, who was the American ambassador in Colombia under Jimmy Carter]